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How are social ties formed? Interaction of neighborhood 
and individual immobility. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using individual data from Japan, this paper investigates how a neighbor’s 
immobility is associated with individual investment in social capital. It is found that 
local homeownership has a positive effect on individual investment and that this effect 
for individual homeowners is about 2.5 times larger than for renters. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the seminal work of Putnam (2000), social capital has been regarded as an 
influential social science concept, with the formation of social capital being a major 
issue for researchers. From an economics viewpoint, it is critical to analyze what gives 
individuals an incentive to invest in social capital (Glaeser et al. 2002). For instance, 
empirical works explore how social capital is accumulated based on individual decision 
making, indicating that a homeowner is more likely to invest in social capital because of 
the lower mobility rates of homeowners (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; Hilber 2007). On 
the other hand, a householder's social ties with neighbors, which can be regarded as a 
kind of social capital, generate benefit for residents (Putnam 2000). This household 
member cannot enjoy this benefit if the household leaves and begins residence in 
another place. As a consequence, local social ties lead to low residential mobility (Kan 
2007). This indicates that individual decision making about investment in social capital 
is affected by the circumstances of where one resides1.  
 Both individual features and neighbor characteristics are thought to be crucial 
determinants of individual investment in social capital. Moreover, assuming that the 
relationships among individuals and neighbors have a crucial role, the neighbor effect 
appears to vary according to individual characteristics. Thus it is important to examine 
the interaction effect between an individual’s and a neighbor’s characteristics. However, 
to date few researchers have attempted to do this. This paper uses individual level data 
from Japan to investigate how the effect of neighbor immobility on individual 
investment in social capital differs between homeowners and renters.  
 
                                                   
1 It is found that people are less likely to cooperate to resolve collective action problems 
in more heterogeneous communities (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000). 
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2. Data and Methods 
The individual level data used in this paper cover information such as social 
capital index, years of living at the current address, homeownership, household income, 
marital and demographic (age and sex) status2. These data were constructed from the 
Social Policy and Social Consciousness (SPSC) survey conducted in all parts of Japan in 
2000. The survey collected data on 3991 adults3. Sample points are divided into 11 areas. 
In each area, according to their population size, cities and towns are divided into 4 
groups such as the 13 metropolitan cities, cities with 200 000 people or greater, cities 
with 100 000 people or greater, and towns and villages. Therefore, 4 population groups 
exist within each of the 11 areas. Hence, area-population groups can be divided into 44, 
which are defined as local groups in this paper. As shown later, variables to capture 
neighbor characteristics are calculated in accord with these local groupings. 
According to Putnam (2000), the degree of civic engagement is considered as 
investment for social capital in this research. Thus social capital is measured using the 
question “Are you actively involved in the activity of a neighborhood association?” 
Responses run from 0 (not at all) to 3 (Yes, actively involved), which are used as the 
dependent variable. I can see from Figure1 that at an average local level, investment in 
social capital is positively related to average homeowner rates; which is consistent with 
existing reports (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; Hilber 2007). For a closer examination, 
I explore how local circumstances of individuals, captured by a neighbor’s 
homeownership and length of residence, are related to individuals’ investment in social 
                                                   
2 The data for this secondary analysis, "Social Policy and Social Consciousness survey 
(SPSC), Shogo Takekawa," were provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, 
Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, 
The University of Tokyo. 
3 Respondents did not respond to all questions and therefore 3075 samples were used 
for regression estimations. 
3 
 
capital. 
Variables used for the regression estimations are shown in Table 1; these include 
variable definitions and mean values of all samples, as well as those of split samples 
such as homeowners and renters. Homeownership is measured using the question 
“What is your type of residence?” The responses were “I own my home”, “I reside in a 
home owned by a parent” and “others”. I defined homeownership as being in a home 
owned by individuals or their parents. The local group average value, AVHOME, is 
incorporated as one of the independent variables. Furthermore, with a view to capture 
the effect of the length of residence, I include AVLIVE 20 representing the local average 
rates of persons who have lived at their current address for longer than 20 years. 
AVHOME and AVLIVE20 are thought to capture the degree of population immobility in 
a particular locality.  
The view of Kan (2007) is that people integrated into neighbor ties are thought to be 
inclined to invest in social capital since the return on investment is expected to be 
sufficiently large. This seems to hold under conditions in which the individual’s barrier 
to moving is high and ties with neighbors are strong. Individual barriers to moving are 
captured by individual homeownership (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999), while ties with 
neighbors can be achieved from AVHOME and AVLIVE20. Therefore, AVHOME and 
AVLIVE20 are predicted to take positive signs and their coefficients should become 
larger when individuals are homeowners. Therefore, when estimations are conducted I 
split samples into homeowners and renters. However, individuals who tend to invest in 
social capital appeared to become homeowners, resulting in selection bias. Therefore, to 
control for this bias, I also conducted Heckman’s sample selection estimation. In the 
first stage of Heckman’s estimation, I used the same variables used in the second stage 
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estimation, area dummies and metropolitan cities dummy as independent variables4. It 
seems appropriate to argue that that area dummies and city size capture the local 
housing market condition, leading me to assume that they are exogenous for an 
individual’s decision on homeownership. 
 Following the model used by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), other independent 
variables, such as marital status, demographic character, education, and household’s 
income are included in the estimation function. 
 
3. Estimation Results  
Table2 sets out the estimation results. Column (1) shows the results using all samples. 
For the purpose of comparing the effect on homeowners with that on renters, Columns 
(2) and (3) present results of homeowner and renter samples, respectively. Column (4) 
provides the results of Heckman’s estimation. I now restricted the results of AVHOME 
and AVLIVE 20 to examine the argument as above.  
In all estimations of AVHOME and AVLIVE20, as anticipated, all coefficient signs are 
positive. As for all estimation results of the samples in column (1), both of AVHOME and 
AVLIVE20 are statistically significant. Furthermore, the values of AVHOME and 
AVLIVE20 are 0.97 and 0.47, respectively. It is interesting to observe that the value of 
AVHOME in column (2), 0.90, is approximately 3 times larger than that in column (3), 
0.34. Also, the value of AVLIVE20 in column (2), 0.50, is about 10 times larger than that 
in column (3), 0.05. Furthermore, AVHOME and AVLIVE20 are statistically significant 
in column (2), whereas they are insignificant in column (3). It follows from this that 
neighbor immobility has a greater effect on homeowners than on renters. Heckman’s 
                                                   
4 There were 13 metropolitan cities in Japan when the survey was conducted. 
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estimation results are shown in column (4); revealing that after controlling for selection 
bias, AVHOME and AVLIVE20 continue to take significant positive signs and the values 
of AVHOME and AVLIVE20 are 0.85 and 0.48, respectively. This suggests that the 
results of AVHOME and AVLIVE20 do not change, indicating that the estimation 
results are robust5. What comes out of the findings above strongly supports the view 
that the relationship between a neighbor’s barriers and an individual’s ones can be 
considered complementary. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The major findings of this analysis, which was based on the individual data, are as 
follows; Neighbor immobility significantly enhances individual investment of 
homeowners in social capital, whereas this neighbor effect on renters is not only smaller 
but also statistically insignificant when samples are restricted to renters. From this, I 
derived the argument that the neighbor immobility effect is increased by an individual’s 
homeownership, and hence interaction between circumstances and an individual’s 
characteristics has a critical role in social capital formation. Thus, I stress the 
importance of simultaneously considering circumstances and individual characteristics 
when analyzing incentives to invest in social capital. 
There are no reports that have examined the relationship between neighbor 
immobility and individual investment in social capital in other countries. As the 
findings of this paper are naturally limited to the situation in Japan; it will, therefore, 
be worthwhile exploring the extent to which these findings are valid under the different 
                                                   
5 In the first stage estimation, a dummy variable for metropolitan cities yielded a 
significant negative sign, implying that individuals are less likely to own a home in 
metropolitan cities. This might be because of the high cost of homes in densely 
populated metropolitan cities.. 
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socioeconomic conditions found in other countries. 
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Table 1 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Note:  a in 10 Million yen increments   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
Definition Full 
sample 
Owners Renters 
SC Degree of involvement in the activities of a 
neighborhood association from 0 (not at all) to 3 
(actively involved).  
1.40 1.51 1.06 
AVHOME 
 
Local average rates of homeownership 0.76 0.77 0.70 
AVLIVE20 Local average rates of persons who have lived at their 
current address for longer than 20 years 
0.61 0.62 0.58 
CHILD 
 
1 if the person has child, otherwise 0.  0.81 0.84 0.70 
MARRI 1 if the person has a spouse, otherwise 0. 
 
 0.79  0.82 0.70 
DIV 1 if the person has been divorced, otherwise 0. 
 
0.03 0.01 0.07 
AGE Ages 
 
50 52 43 
UNIV 1 if the person graduated from a university, otherwise 
0. 
 0.16  0.16 
 
0.15 
MALE 1 if male, otherwise 0. 
 
0.49 0.50 0.46 
INCOME Household income a 
 
0.65 0.69 0.49 
Samples  3075 2349 726 
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Table 2 
Determinants of investment for social capital. 
Variables (1)   
OLS 
All samples 
(2) 
OLS 
Homeowner 
(3)  
OLS 
Renter 
(4) 
HECKMAN 
AVHOME 
 
0.97** 
(5.08) 
0.90** 
(3.93) 
0.34 
(0.92) 
0.85** 
(2.68) 
AVLIVE20 0.47* 
(2.15) 
0.49* 
(1.92) 
0.05 
(0.13) 
0.48* 
(1.84) 
CHILD 
 
0.32** 
(5.83) 
0.29** 
(4.34) 
0.32** 
(3.54) 
0.29** 
(4.17) 
MARRI 0.16** 
(3.14) 
0.16** 
(2.62) 
0.20* 
(2.05) 
0.17** 
(2.63) 
DIV -0.15 
(-1.51) 
-0.16 
(-1.16) 
-0.009 
(-0.07) 
-0.14 
(-0.87) 
AGE 0.01** 
(9.32) 
0.01** 
(7.42) 
0.006** 
(2.73) 
0.01** 
(4.36) 
UNIV -0.09* 
(-2.06) 
-0.10* 
(-1.95) 
-0.09 
(-0.96) 
-0.10* 
(-1.96) 
MALE -0.004 
(-0.14) 
-0.003 
(-0.09) 
-0.008 
(-0.13) 
-0.003 
(-0.09) 
INCOME 0.02 
(0.73) 
-0.009 
(-0.02) 
0.13 
(-1.25) 
-0.001 
(-0.19) 
Adj R- square 0.12 0.10 0.07  
Wald chi- square    574 
Sample size 3075 2349 726 3075 
Uncensored sample    2349 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 
per cent levels respectively (one-sided tests). A constant term is included when an 
estimation was conducted but its result is not reported to save space.  
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Fig.1. Local average social capital investments and local average homeowner rates    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
